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 NOTE 
It’s Dispositive: Considering Constitutional 
Review for First Amendment Retaliation 
Claims 
Bennie v. Munn, 822 F.3d 392 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 814 (2017) 
Abigail E. Williams* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The standard of appellate review is rarely a point of contention.1  The 
proper standard is typically second nature to both judges and lawyers, and it 
is seldom debated during oral argument or the court’s deliberations.2  But the 
standard of review serves as the foundation for every appellate decision.3  
Every federal appellate brief must articulate the standard of review,4 and 
courts often restate the standard in their opinions.  The standard of review 
defines an appellate judge’s discretion, and effective lawyers use the standard 
to help advise clients whether to appeal at all and then to frame their argu-
ments.5 
In some areas of the law, though, the standard of review has not been 
explicitly declared or developed.6  In these areas, the standard becomes con-
tentious, especially where its application might be dispositive.7  In Bennie v. 
Munn, state regulators subjected Robert Bennie, a financial advisor at the 
investment firm Linsco Private Ledger Financial (“LPL”), to heightened reg-
ulation after he made negative comments about President Barack Obama and 
 
*B.A., University of Kansas, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2018; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018.  Thanks to Professor 
Douglas Abrams for his helpful edits and the editors of the Missouri Law Review, 
especially Emma Masse, Anthony Meyer, Kevin Buchanan, Bradley Craigmyle, Ryan 
Prsha, and Ben Levin, for their time and excellent feedback on previous drafts.  All 
mistakes are my own.  I’m grateful to my husband, Aaron, for his unwavering sup-
port.  
 1. DANIEL P. SELMI, PRINCIPLES OF APPELLATE ADVOCACY 33 (2013). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. at 31. 
 4. FED. R. APP. P. 28. 
 5. See SELMI, supra note 1, at 33. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 34 (citing Robert R. Baldock et al., What Appellate Advocates Seek 
from Appellate Judges and What Appellate Judges Seek from Appellate Advocates, 31 
N.M. L. REV. 265, 266 (2001)). 
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actively participated in the Tea Party political movement.8  Bennie filed a 
retaliation claim against the state regulators, alleging that the Nebraska De-
partment of Banking and Finance’s (“Department”) investigation and inquir-
ies violated his First Amendment right to free speech.9  The Eighth Circuit 
discussed three potential standards of review for the “person of ordinary 
firmness” prong of a First Amendment retaliation claim – de novo, clear er-
ror, and independent review.10  The court of appeals indicated that this deci-
sion was important because the standard of review would likely be disposi-
tive.11 
Despite the seemingly well-defined rule that factual findings on appeal 
must be reviewed for clear error, U.S. Supreme Court precedent suggests an 
alternative standard, known as “independent” or “constitutional” review, 
which is used to apply facts to specified constitutional standards.12  Bennie v. 
Munn hardly addresses independent review, but this precedent indicates that 
the conditions that typically trigger independent review are present in the 
question of whether government action would have chilled a “person of ordi-
nary firmness.” 
Part II of this Note introduces the facts and holding in the Eighth Circuit 
case, Bennie v. Munn.  Part III explains the three potential standards of review 
considered by the court in Bennie and then provides a history of the inde-
pendent review standard. Part IV gives the court’s analysis and explains the 
court’s reasoning for its holding. Part V examines the policy and legal con-
siderations courts have and should address before deciding whether an issue 
should receive independent review; ultimately, this Part concludes that the 
person of ordinary firmness prong of a First Amendment retaliation claim 
warrants independent review.  Part VI concludes this Note. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Until November 2010, Robert Bennie was a financial advisor at LPL.13  
As a broker-dealer, LPL and its employees are subject to regulation by the 
Department.14  The Department’s financial regulators investigated Bennie and 
 
 8. Bennie v. Munn, 822 F.3d 392, 395–96 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 814 (2017). 
 9. Id. at 396. 
 10. Id. at 397–98 & n.3. 
 11. Id. at 397–98. 
 12. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 
(1984) (“[I]n cases raising First Amendment issues we have repeatedly held that an 
appellate court has an obligation to ‘make an independent examination of the whole 
record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intru-
sion on the field of free expression.’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 284–86 (1964))). 
 13. See Bennie, 822 F.3d at 394. 
 14. Id. (citing NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8–1120 (West 2017)).  The department 
can “deny, suspend, or revoke registration of any broker-dealer, issuer-dealer, agent” 
2
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LPL on multiple occasions, the most noteworthy of which occurred after a 
newspaper published Bennie’s negative comments about President Obama.15  
Bennie subsequently filed a claim for injunctive relief from the regulators’ 
alleged violation of his First Amendment right.16 
The regulators’ first investigation of Bennie’s activity occurred in late 
2009, when a Department employee, Rodney Griess, reviewed a Certificate 
of Deposit (“CD”) that Bennie had sent to his clients.17  Griess determined 
that the CD failed to meet the Department’s disclosure requirements.18  Near 
the same time, Griess reviewed a television commercial in which Bennie rode 
a horse and offered customers “a hundred dollars towards the purchase of a 
firearm” if they agreed to do business with him.19  Griess thought the offer 
“unusual” and scheduled a conference call for early February 2010 to talk 
with LPL about Bennie’s marketing activity.20 
A few days before the conference call, the Lincoln Journal Star ran a 
story that highlighted Bennie’s role in the Tea Party political movement.21  
The article quoted Bennie’s statement that President Obama was “dishonest,” 
a “communist,” and “an evil man.”22  The article also mentioned Bennie’s 
work with LPL and included a photograph of Bennie at his work office.23  
During the call, Department employees and LPL discussed the CD, the com-
mercial, and the Lincoln Journal Star article.24  Department employees also 
inquired whether LPL had any guidelines about agents publicly communi-
 
for failing to comply with applicable rules for the publishing of advertisements and 
other public statements.  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8–1103(9)(a)–(b) (West 2017). 
 15. Bennie, 822 F.3d at 394. 
 16. Bennie v. Munn, 58 F. Supp. 3d 936, 937 (D. Neb. 2014), aff’d, 822 F.3d 
392 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 814 (2017).  Bennie brought his First 
Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which states:  
 
     Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the dep-
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial 
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was 
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 17. Bennie, 822 F.3d at 394–95. 
 18. Id. at 395.  For a list of these disclosure requirements, see § 8–1103. 
 19. Bennie, 822 F.3d at 395. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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cating their political views.25  Not long after the call, Griess reviewed a mass 
mailing in which Bennie invited prospective customers to discuss their in-
vestment plans over dinner.26  Griess concluded that the invitation violated 
Department rules and ordered LPL to cancel all scheduled dinners.27  Griess 
threatened both Bennie and LPL with “whatever administrative action 
deemed necessary and appropriate under its authority . . . to insure compli-
ance.”28 
In late February, Bennie alerted Nebraska Governor David Heineman to 
the Department’s targeting of Bennie’s political views.29  Governor Heine-
man then called the Department to discuss the situation.30  After this ex-
change, Griess investigated another mailing from Bennie and again conclud-
ed that the advertisement violated the Department’s disclosure rules.31  In 
early November 2010, LPL fired Bennie.32  In mid-2011, Bennie filed a pub-
lic records request and obtained the Department’s investigation files.33  He 
then stopped publicly criticizing President Obama and arranging Tea Party 
events.34 
Bennie filed a retaliation claim against the state regulators on the theory 
that the Department’s investigation and inquiries violated his First Amend-
ment right to free speech.35  The Eighth Circuit has held that to establish a 
First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the plaintiff 
must show that “(1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the government 
official[s] took adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordi-
nary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was 
motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.”36  Bennie 
argued that the state regulators’ increased monitoring of his business was 
motivated by his political speech and that this increased monitoring would 
chill a person of ordinary firmness.37  The state regulators argued that their 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 395–96.  
 29. Id. at 396. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 397 (alteration in original) (quoting Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 
876 (8th Cir. 2004)).  “In brief, the plaintiff must show the official took the adverse 
action because the plaintiff engaged in the protected speech.”  Revels, 382 F.3d at 
876; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 37. Bennie, 822 F.3d at 399–400. 
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actions were lawful because they simply made routine, “legitimate inquiries” 
regarding Bennie’s advertising activities.38 
After a bench trial, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska 
determined the state regulators’ investigations of Bennie and LPL “were mo-
tivated, to varying degrees, by the content of [Bennie’s] speech” and were 
“arguably unconstitutional.”39  Despite this finding, the court held that if there 
was a constitutional violation it was “de minimis” because the state regula-
tors’ actions did not chill Bennie’s political speech.40  The court dismissed 
Bennie’s First Amendment retaliation complaint,41 and Bennie appealed to 
the Eighth Circuit.42 
The Eighth Circuit recognized that the first element of the First 
Amendment retaliation claim was satisfied because Bennie indisputably en-
gaged in a protected activity.43  The second element, whether “the govern-
ment official[s] took adverse action against [Bennie] that would chill a person 
of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity,” was the focus of the 
appeal.44  The Eighth Circuit did not reach the third element.45  Before ana-
lyzing whether the district court erred in concluding that the state regulators’ 
actions against Bennie would not have chilled an ordinary person’s speech, 
the panel stated that the standard of review would likely be dispositive.46 
Bennie argued that the proper standard was de novo because the district 
court “held the adverse acts he alleged were insufficient as a matter of law, 
which is necessarily a legal conclusion.”47  The Eighth Circuit rejected Ben-
nie’s argument on the ground that the district court’s reference to the alleged 
retaliation as “de minimis” was not a legal ruling but instead, “encapsulate[d] 
the factual finding that, on the evidence presented, the state regulators’ ac-
tions were insufficiently substantial to be actionable.”48 
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s finding for clear error, 
meaning that a reversal was warranted only if, “upon a review of the entire 
record” the court formed a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed.”49  The court held that the district court did not clearly err 
 
 38. Bennie v. Munn, 58 F. Supp. 3d 936, 942 (D. Neb. 2014), aff’d, 822 F.3d 
392 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 814 (2017). 
 39. Id. at 943. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 944. 
 42. Bennie, 822 F.3d at 392. 
 43. Id. at 397. 
 44. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 
(8th Cir. 2004)). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 397–98. 
 47. Id. at 398 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 49. Id. (quoting Ridgway v. United Hosps.-Miller Div., 563 F.2d 923, 927 (8th 
Cir. 1977)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact . . . must not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the 
5
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when it determined the state regulators’ investigations into Bennie’s political 
speech would not have “chill[ed] a person of ordinary firmness from continu-
ing in the activity.”50 
After the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Ben-
nie’s claim, Bennie petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.51  
Both Bennie and the state regulators indicated that the threshold issue on 
certiorari would be the proper standard of review for First Amendment retali-
ation claims.52  The Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving important ques-
tions (explored in this Note) for another day.53 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The standard of review defines the level of deference an appellate court 
grants the district court.54  In Bennie, the Eighth Circuit discussed three po-
tential standards of review for the person of ordinary firmness prong of a First 
Amendment retaliation claim – de novo, clear error, and independent re-
view.55  This Part first addresses the elements of a First Amendment retalia-
tion claim.  It then explains the three potential standards of review for the 
person of ordinary firmness prong and provides an analysis of the legal histo-
ry of independent review. 
A.  First Amendment Retaliation Claim 
To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, an individual must 
show that “(1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the government offi-
cial[s] took adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary 
firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was moti-
vated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.”56 
The “ordinary firmness test” is well established in First Amendment ju-
risprudence.57  The test is “designed to weed out trivial matters from those 
deserving the time of the courts as real and substantial violations of the First 
 
trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”); Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (clarifying that the “clearly erroneous” 
standard does not allow a reviewing court to reverse simply because it would have 
decided differently). 
 50. Bennie, 822 F.3d at 397 (quoting Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th 
Cir. 2004)). 
 51. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bennie, 822 F.3d 392 (No. 14-3473). 
 52. See id. at 18; Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25–26, 
Bennie, 822 F.3d 392 (No. 14-3473). 
 53. Bennie v. Munn, 137 S. Ct. 812 (2017). 
 54. See SELMI, supra note 1, at 35. 
 55. See Bennie, 822 F.3d at 397–98 & n.3. 
 56. Id. at 397 (alteration in original) (quoting Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 
876 (8th Cir. 2004)); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 57. Garcia v. City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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Amendment.”58  The Eighth Circuit has reiterated these words of Judge Rich-
ard Posner of the Seventh Circuit: “The effect on freedom of speech may be 
small, but since there is no justification for harassing people for exercising 
their constitutional rights it need not be great in order to be actionable.”59  
Thus, a “chilling effect” can stem from the threat “‘of continued and height-
ened regulatory scrutiny’ . . . regardless of whether it ultimately results in 
sanctions being imposed.”60  Further, “[a]lthough it is true that ‘how [a] 
plaintiff acted might be evidence of what a reasonable person would have 
done,’ the ordinary-firmness inquiry is at bottom ‘an objective one, not sub-
jective.’”61 
B.  Three Potential Standards of Review for the Person of Ordinary 
Firmness Prong 
As discussed in Bennie, there are three potential standards of review for 
the person of ordinary firmness prong – de novo, clear error, and independent 
review.62  De novo review applies when an appellate court reviews a question 
of law.63  The court need not defer to the lower court’s declaration of the law 
because it is the duty of the judge, and not the fact finder of the lowest court, 
to declare and apply the law.64  When an appellate court reviews an issue de 
novo, it decides “without reference to any legal conclusion or assumption 
made by the previous court to hear the case.”65  Thus, an appellate court hear-
ing a case de novo “may refer to the lower court’s record to determine the 
facts” but will not “rule on the evidence and matters of law without deferring 
to that court’s findings.”66  Appellants favor de novo review because the ap-
pellate court’s limited deference to the trial court allows greater opportunity 
for reversal.67 
 
 58. Id. (citing Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
 59. Id. at 729 (quoting Bart, 677 F.2d at 625). 
 60. Bennie, 822 F.3d at 399 (quoting Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 
532 (4th Cir. 2006)). 
 61. Id. at 400 (second alteration in original) (quoting Garcia, 328 F.3d at 729).  
In Garcia, the Eighth Circuit held that the government’s issuing of thirty-five-dollar 
parking tickets in response to plaintiff’s “speaking out” presented an issue of material 
fact as to whether the government’s action would chill an individual of ordinary firm-
ness.  Garcia, 328 F.3d at 729. 
 62. See Bennie, 822 F.3d at 397–98 & n.3. 
 63. See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 
(2014). 
 64. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 607 (8th ed. 2012). 
 65. De Novo, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/de_novo (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2018). 
 66. Id. 
 67. SELMI, supra note 1, at 33. 
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De novo review is contrasted with the clear error standard, which the 
Eighth Circuit determined was the proper standard of review in Bennie.68  
Appellate courts apply the clear error standard when they review a trial 
court’s factual findings.69  When reviewing a finding of fact, an appellate 
court must defer to the fact finder because it is the duty of the jury (or in the 
case of a bench trial, the trial court) to make findings of fact.70  This standard 
is codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which states, “Findings 
of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial 
court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”71 
In Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, the Supreme Court expanded up-
on the meaning of the clear error standard.72  The Court noted, “[A] finding is 
‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the review-
ing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.”73  Thus, if the district court’s account of 
the evidence “is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the 
court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been 
sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.”74  
The Court emphasized that this rule has no exceptions.75  An appellate court 
reviewing a trial court’s factual findings must defer to the trial court unless 
the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous.76  Thus, the appellate court 
typically takes the verdict or findings by the jury or a judge in a bench trial as 
conclusive.77 
A final standard, which the court in Bennie hardly considered, is known 
as independent or constitutional review.78  This standard applies when the 
 
 68. See Bennie v. Munn, 822 F.3d 392, 398 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 814 (2017). 
 69. See SELMI, supra note 1, at 30.  Appellate courts generally give the same 
level of deference to the fact-findings of a judge in a bench trial as that given to jury 
verdicts.  5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 936 (2017). 
 70. See YEAZELL, supra note 64, 606–07. 
 71. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). 
 72. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). 
 73. Id. (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 
 74. Id. at 573–74 (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). 
 75. Id. at 574. 
 76. Id. at 573–74.  “Rule 52(a) ‘does not make exceptions or purport to exclude 
certain categories of factual findings from the obligation of a court of appeals to ac-
cept a district court’s findings unless clearly erroneous.’”  Id. at 574 (quoting Pull-
man-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982)). 
 77. Appeal and Error, supra note 69, at § 919. 
 78. See Bennie v. Munn, 822 F.3d 392, 398 n.3 (8th Cir. 2016) (“At oral argu-
ment, Bennie for the first time invoked the rule that [a]n appellate court’s review . . . 
is unique in the context of a First Amendment Claim, requiring an independent exam-
ination of the whole record.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 621 (8th Cir. 
8
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appellate court reviews a mixed question of fact or law or a trial court’s ap-
plication of facts to a constitutional standard.79  Independent review requires 
an independent examination of the portion of the record that relates to the 
constitutional determination.80  Thus, this standard is essentially a de novo 
review of the case’s constitutional facts.81 
The following example, drawn from Ornelas v. United States discussed 
in this Part below,82 illuminates the differences among a question of law, a 
question of fact, and a mixed question of fact and law.83  As indicated above, 
this distinction determines which standard of review applies.  For example, 
under the Fourth Amendment, “when must an officer show probable cause to 
engage in a search?” is a question of law.84  “What did the officer know be-
fore engaging in a search of the defendant’s property?” is a question of fact.85 
“Would the knowledge of the officer at the time of the search lead an objec-
tively reasonable officer to believe there was probable cause?” is a mixed 
question of fact and law.86 
Similarly, the person of ordinary firmness prong of a First Amendment 
retaliation claim is a mixed question of fact and law.  Whether the govern-
ment officials’ actions were adverse is a question of fact, and whether the 
officials’ actions went beyond that permitted under the First Amendment is a 
 
2002) (en banc))), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 814 (2017).  Courts also use the following 
terms to describe constitutional fact review: “de novo,” “free,” and “plenary.”  
STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 
2.14 (3d ed. 1999). 
 79. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 
(1989). 
 80. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 n.31 
(1984). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See infra discussion at notes 132–137. 
 83. This example is derived from commentary in an amicus brief written by nine 
law professors who are experts in appellate practice.  See Motion for Leave to File 
Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of Nine Law Professors Who Write 
About Appellate Review in Support of Petitioner at 6, Bennie, 822 F.3d 392 (No. 14-
3473) 
 84. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696–97 (1996) (“The principal 
components of a determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the 
events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether 
these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police 
officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause.  The first part of the 
analysis involves only a determination of historical facts, but the second is a mixed 
question of law and fact: ‘[T]he historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of 
law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or 
constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to 
the established facts is or is not violated.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982))). 
 85. See id.  
 86. See id. 
9
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question of law.  Whether the government officials “took adverse action . . . 
that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activi-
ty”87 is a mixed question of fact and law. 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision to apply the clear error standard to the 
person of ordinary firmness prong of a First Amendment retaliation claim 
does not differ from the decisions of other circuits.88  The absence of a split 
among the circuits may have led the Supreme Court to deny certiorari, but 
further examination of constitutional jurisprudence indicates reasons to con-
sider the independent review standard for the person of ordinary firmness 
prong.  In its swift dismissal of independent review in Bennie, the Eighth 
Circuit created the impression that the independent review standard is used 
only when the issue is whether activity constituted a protected category of 
speech.89  In actuality, the standard has been applied in other instances,90 and 
many constitutional scholars have argued that the realm of independent re-
view should include cases such as Bennie.91  Thus, the final portion of this 
Part develops the legal history and framework of the independent review 
standard, which will be examined throughout the remainder of this Note. 
 
 87. Bennie v. Munn, 822 F.3d 392, 397 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
814 (2017). 
 88. While Bennie argues that there is a circuit split on the standard of review for 
the “person of ordinary firmness” prong of the First Amendment retaliation claim, 
this is not the case.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 51, at 15 (“In de-
termining that an appellate court should review a trial court’s ‘ordinary firmness’ 
holding for clear error, the Eighth Circuit exacerbated a split among the circuit 
courts.”).  In reality, every circuit that has addressed the issue has held that the person 
of ordinary firmness prong of a First Amendment retaliation claim receives clear error 
review.  See, e.g., Starr v. Dube, 334 F. App’x 341, 343 (1st Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 
(“[W]e cannot say that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that inmates of ‘ordi-
nary firmness’ would be deterred from continuing to exercise their constitutional 
rights merely because of the filing of a disciplinary charge carrying potentially severe 
sanctions.”); Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e have no 
trouble finding on the record in this case that there is a triable issue of fact as to 
whether a severe beating by officers over the course of thirty minutes would deter a 
person of ‘ordinary firmness’ from exercising his rights.”). The First Circuit, Second 
Circuit, Third Circuit, Fifth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, Eighth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, Tenth 
Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit have each addressed this issue.  Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 52, at 30–31. 
 89. See Bennie, 822 F.3d at 398 n.3. 
 90. See, e.g., Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697 (applying independent review to the issue 
of whether an officer had probable cause to search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 91. See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of 
Nine Law Professors Who Write About Appellate Review in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 83. 
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C.  The Legal History and Framework of Independent Review 
Historically, issues that receive independent review typically have fallen 
into one of two categories.92  The issue is either (1) an intermingled question 
of fact and law or (2) an important constitutional right.  The standard first 
surfaced under the first category.93  In a line of decisions that did not impli-
cate First Amendment speech, the Supreme Court emphasized: 
[A federal appellate court] will review the finding of facts by a state 
court (1) where a federal right has been denied as the result of a find-
ing shown by the record to be without evidence to support it, and (2) 
where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and findings of fact 
are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the 
Federal question, to analyze the facts.94 
Thus, initially, an appellate court’s independent review of factual find-
ings occurred only in the context of federal appellate court review of a state 
court’s findings.95  The Court applied this standard to avoid having state court 
factual findings adversely influence federal law.96 
In Norris v. Alabama, the Supreme Court used this justification to apply 
the independent review standard to a due process claim.97  Norris reversed the 
Supreme Court of Alabama’s affirmance of the convictions of seven African 
American males on the ground that the convictions denied due process of 
law.98  In reviewing the lower court decisions, the Court recognized that the 
issue depended on application of facts to a legal standard.99  The Court ap-
 
 92. Compare N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 593 (1915) (noting 
that a federal appellate court will review findings of fact by the state court where 
“findings of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the 
Federal question, to analyze the facts”), with N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 285 (1964) (noting that an independent examination of the record must be made 
in order to ensure that the judgment does not constitute an intrusion on a constitution-
al right). 
 93. See N. Pac. Ry., 236 U.S. at 593. 
 94. Id. at 593 (emphasis added) (citing Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. C. H. Albers 
Comm’n Co., 223 U.S. 573, 591 (1912); Creswill v. Grand Lodge Knights, 225 U.S. 
246, 261 (1912); Wood v. Chesborough, 228 U.S. 672, 678 (1913)). 
 95. See id. 
 96. See Kan. City S. Ry., 223 U.S. at 591 (noting that “where the conclusiveness 
of findings of fact by a state court was elaborately considered, it was recognized that 
where the question is ‘of the competency and legal effect of the evidence as bearing 
upon a question of Federal law, the decision may be reviewed by this court’” (citing 
Dower v. Richards, 151 U.S. 658, 667 (1894))). 
 97. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590 (1935). 
 98. Id. at 588.  The Court held that a violation of Due Process occurred because 
“the trial court had failed in the light of the circumstances disclosed . . . to make an 
effective appointment of counsel to aid them.”  Id. 
 99. Id. at 589. 
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plied independent review because “whenever a conclusion of law of a state 
court as to a federal right and findings of fact are so intermingled that the 
latter control the former, it is incumbent upon us to analyze the facts in order 
that the appropriate enforcement of the federal right may be assured.”100  The 
Norris Court’s rationale for independent review mirrored the “intermingled” 
language of the Court’s earlier precedent,101 but the Court’s decision to use 
the standard also included a trace of the second category of independent re-
view cases – those that address issues of important constitutional rights.102 
The first line of decisions that applied the “important constitutional 
rights” justification for de novo review of constitutional facts occurred in the 
area of administrative law.103  In Crowell v. Benson, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Act under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.104  In determining 
that it would review the case de novo, the Court emphasized that “the statute 
contains no express limitation attempting to preclude the court . . . from mak-
ing its own examination and determination of facts whenever that is deemed 
to be necessary to enforce a constitutional right properly asserted.”105  But the 
Court made explicit that de novo review in this context was warranted only in 
cases involving constitutional rights.106  Otherwise, “the findings of the depu-
ty commissioner, supported by evidence and within the scope of his authority, 
shall be final.”107 
 
 100. Id. at 590.  The Court further avowed,  
 
That the question is one of fact does not relieve us of the duty to determine 
whether in truth a federal right has been denied.  When a federal right has 
been specially set up and claimed in a state court, it is our province to inquire 
not merely whether it was denied in express terms but also whether it was de-
nied in substance and effect. If this requires an examination of evidence, that 
examination must be made.  Otherwise, review by this Court would fail of its 
purpose in safeguarding constitutional rights. 
 
 Id. at 589–90. 
 101. Compare id. at 590 (“[W]henever a conclusion of law of a state court as to a 
federal right and findings of fact are so intermingled that the latter control the former, 
it is incumbent upon us to analyze the facts in order that the appropriate enforcement 
of the federal right may be assured.”), with N. Pac. Ry. Co v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 
585, 593 (1915) (“[W]here a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and findings of 
fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the federal 
question, to analyze the facts.”). 
 102. Norris, 294 U.S. at 590. 
 103. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 277–78 (1922); Crowell v. Benson, 
285 U.S. 22, 36–37 (1932). 
 104. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 36–37.  The employer argued that the claimant was not 
“at the time of his injury an employee . . . and his claim was not ‘within the jurisdic-
tion’ of the Deputy Commissioner.”  Id. at 37. 
 105. Id. at 46. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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About a decade after Crowell, the Court began applying independent re-
view in the First Amendment context.108  Pennekamp v. Florida, a landmark 
First Amendment decision, emphasized that appellate courts should apply 
independent review to ensure the protection of important constitutional 
rights.109  The Court asserted that the Constitution imposed on it “final au-
thority to determine the meaning and application of those words of that in-
strument,” and that this responsibility compelled it “to examine for [itself] the 
statements in issue and the circumstances under which they [are] made.”110 
Nearly twenty years after Pennekamp, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
applied independent review to First Amendment speech claims.111  In Sulli-
van, the Court addressed whether a state’s libel law abridged the freedom of 
speech and the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.112  
Determining that independent review applied, the Court noted, “This Court’s 
duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles; we must 
also in proper cases review the evidence to make certain that those principles 
have been constitutionally applied.”113  According to the Court, this standard 
of review was especially applicable in Sullivan because “the question [was] 
one of alleged trespass across the line between speech unconditionally guar-
anteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated.”114  The Court then 
reviewed the record to determine whether evidence demonstrated actual mal-
ice by the New York Times.115 
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, considering again whether an action 
constituted “actual malice” in the First Amendment context, the Court ex-
panded upon Sullivan’s independent review rule.116  Bose first emphasized 
that independent review, as articulated in Sullivan, is consistent with Rule 
52(a), which defines the clearly erroneous standard.117  The Sullivan rule re-
 
 108. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  The Court continued, “When the highest court of a state has reached a 
determination upon such an issue, we give most respectful attention to its reasoning 
and conclusion but its authority is not final.  Were it otherwise the constitutional lim-
its of free expression in the Nation would vary with state lines.”  Id.; see also Jacobel-
lis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 189 (1964) (holding that an individual’s conviction for the 
possession of obscene film should be independently reviewed). 
 111. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 
525 (1958)).  The Court continued, “We must make an independent examination of 
the whole record, so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a 
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.”  Id. (citation and internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)). 
 115. Id. at 287.  The Court noted, “The mere presence of the stories in the files 
does not, of course, establish that the Times ‘knew’ the advertisement was false . . . .”  
Id. 
 116. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984). 
 117. Id. at 499. 
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quires an appellate court to make an independent review of the entire record, 
and Rule 52(a) “never forbids such an examination.”118 
Further, Bose noted that “Rule 52(a) commands that ‘due regard’ shall 
be given to the trial judge’s opportunity to observe the demeanor of the wit-
nesses; the constitutionally-based rule of independent review permits this 
opportunity to be given its due.”119  According to the Court, constitutional 
questions, such as the determination of whether an act constitutes “actual 
malice,” do not just involve Rule 52(a) questions for the trier of fact but in-
stead are issues that involve “central legal question[s].”120 
Next, Bose defined three key considerations that Sullivan applied to de-
termine the propriety of independent review.121  First, the Court noted that 
Sullivan applied independent review because the actual malice rule’s “com-
mon-law heritage” assigned “an especially broad role to the judge in applying 
it to specific factual situations.”122  Second, courts should apply independent 
review where “the content of the rule is not revealed simply by its literal text, 
but rather is given meaning through the evolutionary process of common-law 
adjudication; though the source of the rule is found in the Constitution, it is 
nevertheless largely a judge-made rule of law.”123  Finally, Bose considered 
whether “the constitutional values protected by the rule make it imperative 
that judges – and in some cases judges of this Court – make sure that it is 
correctly applied.”124  The Court emphasized the importance of its duty to 
“preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitu-
tion.”125  Like Sullivan, Bose involved a question of whether a category of 
speech required First Amendment protection;126 however, Bose implied that 
courts could apply independent review in other contexts, such as those in-
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 499–500 
 120. Id. at 514. 
 121. Id. at 502. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 511. 
 126. Id. at 513.  Following Bose, the Court continued to apply the independent 
review standard to questions regarding whether a type of speech is protected under 
the First Amendment.  In Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 
(1989), the Court again applied the independent review standard to a question of 
whether speech involved “actual malice.”  Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 686.  
The Court further emphasized the importance of independent review to ensure that 
protected speech is not discouraged.  Id.  In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & 
Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), the Court determined whether a state 
could require private citizens to include a message in their parade that the citizens did 
not want to convey.  Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559.  The Court in Hurley emphasized that 
this was an “intermingled” decision of fact and law because “the reaches of the First 
Amendment are ultimately defined by the facts it is held to embrace.”  Id. at 567. 
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volving a mixed question of fact and law, provided that courts consider the 
above factors.127 
Following Bose, the Court applied independent review in constitutional 
contexts beyond the First Amendment.128  For instance, in Miller v. Fenton, 
the Court applied independent review to scrutinize a confession’s admissibil-
ity under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.129  In justi-
fying this application, the Court noted that the case presented an instance in 
which the relevant legal principle was given meaning “only through its appli-
cation to the particular circumstances of a case.”130  The Court noted that 
independent review could be justified in other cases, such as cases that raise 
concern that the trier of fact might be biased and those in which it is not nec-
essary to give great deference to the trial court.131 
Similarly, in Ornelas v. United States, the Court applied independent re-
view to determine whether an officer had reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause to complete a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment.132  The 
Court said that the principal components of a reasonable suspicion or proba-
ble cause determination are “the events which occurred leading up to the stop 
or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from 
the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasona-
ble suspicion or to probable cause.”133  The Court noted that the first part of 
this analysis is only a determination of “historical fact” but that the second is 
a “mixed question of law and fact,” requiring independent review.134  The 
Court concluded that deferring to the trial court in areas such as this would 
produce “varied results” and unclear precedent.135  However, in his dissent, 
Justice Antonin Scalia argued that this law-clarifying justification requires 
generalization, and “probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations 
are . . . resistant to generalization.”136  According to Justice Scalia, the facts in 
Ornelas that underlay the reasonable suspicion and probable cause analysis 
were specific and unique.137 
 
 127. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 501. 
 128. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985); Ornelas v. United States, 517 
U.S. 690, 697 (1996). 
 129. Miller, 474 U.S. at 115.  In Miller, the ultimate issue was the “voluntariness” 
of the petitioner’s confession.  Id. at 108–09.  Thus, the Court reviewed the record to 
determine whether the interrogation was “so offensive to a civilized system of justice 
that [it] must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”  Id. at 109. 
 130. Id. at 114. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696–97. 
 133. Id. at 696. 
 134. Id. at 696–97, 699. 
 135. Id. at 697. 
 136. Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 704. 
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This survey of precedent indicates that independent review is applied in 
contexts beyond the question of whether a certain category of speech is pro-
tected.138  Indeed, a court’s determination of whether it should engage in in-
dependent review should not simply depend on an issue’s type or category 
but instead requires more searching legal and policy considerations, which 
are discussed in Part V. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In Bennie v. Munn, the Eighth Circuit held the district court did not 
clearly err when it determined that the state regulators’ investigations into 
Bennie’s political speech would not have “chill[ed] a person of ordinary 
firmness from continuing in the activity.”139  In an opinion authored by Judge 
William J. Riley, the court of appeals noted that the first element of a First 
Amendment retaliation claim, whether Bennie engaged in a protected activi-
ty, was not at issue.140  The court did not reach the third element of whether 
“the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the pro-
tected activity.”141  Thus, this appeal solely focused on the second element of 
a First Amendment retaliation claim: whether the government officials took 
adverse action that would “chill a person of ordinary firmness from continu-
ing in the activity.”142 
The court first discussed the standard of review that should apply to a 
district court’s determination that government action would not chill a “per-
son of ordinary firmness.”143  The court noted that the standard of review 
applied “likely is dispositive.”144  The panel rejected the de novo standard in 
favor of clear error, concluding that the district court’s reference to the state 
regulators’ action as “de minimis” was not “to denote a legal ruling, but ra-
ther to encapsulate the factual finding that, on the evidence presented, the 
state regulators’ actions were insufficiently substantial to be actionable.”145 
In a footnote, the court also rejected the independent review standard.146  
The court distinguished Bennie from other First Amendment decisions that 
applied the independent review standard.147  The panel reasoned that courts 
had used independent review to determine whether a category of speech was 
protected.148  Here, it was undisputed that Bennie’s speech was protected.149  
 
 138. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985); Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697. 
 139. Bennie v. Munn, 822 F.3d 392, 397, 401 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 812 (2017). 
 140. Id. at 397. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 397–98. 
 144. Id. at 398. 
 145. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 146. Id. at 398 n.3. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/12
2017] CONSIDERING CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 1251 
Instead, the issue was “the deterrent effect of the state regulators’ actions,” 
which according to the Eighth Circuit was “not the sort of finding that might 
trigger” independent review.150  Thus, the Eighth Circuit concluded that inde-
pendent review of the constitutional facts was not justified.151 
When reviewing the district court’s finding, the court in Bennie held that 
“while the record in this case might well have supported a conclusion that an 
ordinary person’s speech would have been chilled, it did not compel such a 
finding.”152  In so holding, the court of appeals noted that except for the order 
demanding the canceling of Bennie’s dinner meetings, “Bennie did not show 
the state regulators’ actions directly affected him or his business in any 
way.”153 
Despite affirming the decision below, the Eighth Circuit cautioned 
against the manner in which the district court applied the person of ordinary 
firmness test.154  The panel indicated that the district court incorrectly empha-
sized whether Bennie’s speech was in fact chilled, instead of whether the 
speech of a person of ordinary firmness would have been chilled.155  The 
panel stated, “This case illustrates some of the dangers of giving undue 
weight to how a particular plaintiff actually responded to government retalia-
tion, rather than how a hypothetical reasonable person would have react-
ed.”156 
According to the Eighth Circuit, Bennie’s response to the regulators’ ac-
tions was particularly unrepresentative of an “ordinary person” because Ben-
nie was unaware of the extent to which the regulators were acting against his 
speech.157  Further, Bennie was unlike an ordinary person because he was 
“unusually resilient and determined.”158  Additionally, Bennie did not have 
total knowledge of the Department’s actions until he requested the public 
records a year after he was fired from LPL.159  Thus, the Eighth Circuit speci-
fied that Bennie’s activity with the Tea Party movement in the meantime did 
not necessarily indicate that the regulators’ actions would not have chilled an 
ordinary person’s speech.160  Applying the clear error standard, however, the 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 399 (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 
(1985)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 400. 
 155. Id. at 399–400.  The Eighth Circuit noted that this more subjective approach 
was especially dangerous in this case because Bennie did not have total knowledge of 
the Department’s actions until long after the Department had ended its investigations.  
Id. at 400–01. 
 156. Id. at 400. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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court of appeals held that the record did not compel a reversal of the district 
court’s finding that the state regulators’ actions would not have chilled a per-
son of ordinary firmness.161 
Judge C. Arlen Beam concurred in the court’s decision to apply the clear 
error standard but dissented from the court’s ultimate holding.162  According 
to Judge Beam, the district court clearly erred in two respects – first, by rely-
ing “entirely on the actions of an unusually resilient and determined individu-
al . . . as evidence of how a person of ordinary firmness would respond to the 
department’s increased regulatory scrutiny”163 and second by neglecting “to 
account for Bennie’s self-censorship at the time he became fully aware of the 
department’s retaliatory motivation in mid-2011.”164 
Judge Beam emphasized that to the extent a court examines the reaction 
of the retaliation’s target to help determine how an ordinary person might 
react, “it must be the case that the recipient is aware of the retaliatory motiva-
tion behind the adverse action.”165  Judge Beam noted that once Bennie be-
came aware of the Department’s “marginally increased interest,” his “unusu-
ally firm resolve gave way to self-censorship.”166  According to Judge Beam, 
it was clear error not to conclude that an ordinary person would have reacted 
similarly.167  Because the Department’s adverse action was clearly motivated 
at least in part by Bennie’s political statements, Judge Beam would have held 
that “the [D]epartment’s actions were motivated in part by retaliation against 
Bennie’s speech and thus that each of the three elements of a First Amend-
ment retaliation claim were satisfied.”168 
V.  COMMENT 
In determining the standard of appellate review in Bennie, the Eighth 
Circuit rejected independent review because the issue was not “whether Ben-
nie’s speech was protected by the First Amendment” but was instead whether 
 
 161. Id. at 401 (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 
(1985)). 
 162. Id. at 401 (Beam, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 163. Id. at 401–02 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 164. Id. at 402. 
 165. Id.  Judge Beam continued: 
 
Although Bennie knew the department was focusing on him in the spring of 
2010 and suspected it was because of his political activities, it was not until 
mid-2011 that he knew the extent to which his political statements impelled 
the department’s actions.  In light of Bennie’s resilient nature, the resulting 
self-censorship tends to demonstrate, if anything, that an ordinary, less resili-
ent person would react similarly. 
 
Id. 
 166. Id. at 402. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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the state regulators’ actions had a deterrent effect on Bennie’s speech.169  The 
Eighth Circuit implied that the independent review standard may be applied 
only where the issue on appeal is whether a category of speech warrants First 
Amendment protection.170  But the Supreme Court has not drawn a fine line 
to determine when independent review is applicable.171  As specified in Part 
III above, the Court’s precedents indicate other circumstances in which inde-
pendent review has been and can be applied. 
The issues that receive independent review typically fall into one or both 
of these categories: (1) a mixed question of fact and law or (2) an important 
constitutional right.172  This Part examines the policy and legal considerations 
courts have and should address before deciding whether an issue that falls 
into one of these categories should receive independent review.  In Bennie, 
the Eighth Circuit did not explore whether the person of ordinary firmness 
prong of the First Amendment retaliation test falls in either or both of these 
categories but instead dismissed the standard in a footnote.173  Thus, this Part 
examines these considerations within the context of Bennie to determine 
whether independent review should be expanded to the person of ordinary 
firmness prong of First Amendment retaliation claims.  Ultimately, this Part 
concludes that the independent review standard could have been justified 
under either of the two categories. 
A.  Issues Involving a Mixed Question of Fact and Law 
A mixed question of fact and law exists when “[t]he historical facts are 
admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether 
the facts satisfy the [relevant] . . . [constitutional] standard.”174  Here, the 
relevant “historical facts” are established and the rule of law is undisputed.175  
To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show: 
“(1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the government official took ad-
verse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from 
continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in 
part by the exercise of the protected activity.”176  The question is not one of 
pure fact or law but is whether the facts satisfy the relevant constitutional 
standard.  As indicated in Part III, whether the government officials’ actions 
 
 169. Id. at 398 n.3 (majority opinion). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 701 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that there is “no rigid rule” with respect to when independent review is 
utilized). 
 172. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 173. Bennie, 822 F.3d at 398 n.3. 
 174. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982)). 
 175. See id. at 696–97. 
 176. Bennie v. Munn, 58 F. Supp. 3d 936, 942 (D. Neb. 2014) (emphasis added), 
aff’d, 822 F.3d 392 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 814 (2017). 
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were adverse is a question of fact, and whether the officials’ actions went 
beyond that permitted under the First Amendment is a question of law.  
Whether the government officials “took adverse action . . . that would chill a 
person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity”177 is a mixed 
question of fact and law.  Thus, the person of ordinary firmness prong of a 
First Amendment retaliation claim is a mixed question of fact and law. 
But simply because an issue involves a mixed question does not auto-
matically require an appellate court to utilize independent review.178  When a 
mixed question of fact and law exists, appellate courts must balance various 
considerations in order to determine whether independent review should be 
applied.179 These considerations include: the type of factual application to the 
law involved,180 the need to clarify legal principles and unify precedent,181 
and the possible bias of the fact finder.182  These considerations lead to one 
overarching question – whether the appellate judge is better positioned than 
the fact finder to make decisions regarding mixed questions of fact and 
law.183 
1.  The Type of Factual Application to the Law 
  The issue of whether an action would “chill a person of ordinary firm-
ness” requires the application of a “reasonable person” standard.184  A rea-
sonable person standard does not seem to involve considerations that are bet-
ter left to the trier of fact.185  The issue does not turn on the credibility of wit-
nesses, which would require the fact finder to observe witness demeanor.186  
Because a reasonable person standard is not a pure question of fact but in-
stead involves the application of facts to a legal standard, the appellate court 
should review the constitutional facts de novo. 
 
 177. Bennie, 822 F.3d at 397. 
 178. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Merely labeling the issues 
mixed questions, however, does not establish that they receive de novo review . . . . 
[as] there is no rigid rule with respect to mixed questions.” (internal quotations and 
citation omitted) (quoting First Option of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 948 
(1995))). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 517 (1984) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 181. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697. 
 182. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985). 
 183. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 701 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 184. Bennie v. Munn, 822 F.3d 392, 397 (8th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 812 (2017).  
 185. See Miller, 474 U.S. at 114 (“[O]ther considerations often suggest the appro-
priateness of resolving close questions concerning the status of an issue as one of 
‘law’ or ‘fact’ in favor of extending deference to the trial court.”). 
 186. Id. 
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/12
2017] CONSIDERING CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 1255 
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has applied independent review 
in cases that required the application of the reasonable person standard.187  
For example, in Ornelas the issue was whether the “historical facts, viewed 
from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount[ed] to 
reasonable suspicion or to probable cause.”188  Similarly, in Street v. New 
York the Court applied the reasonable person standard to determine whether 
challenged remarks “were so inherently inflammatory as to come within that 
small class of fighting words which are likely to provoke the average person 
to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.”189 
Further, the person of ordinary firmness rule fits within the considera-
tions defined by Bose to determine whether independent review should apply 
to a specific standard.190  Like the rules at issue in Sullivan and Bose, the per-
son of ordinary firmness rule stems from “common-law heritage,” which 
“assigns an especially broad role to the judge in applying it to specific factual 
situations.”191  Additionally, “the content of the rule is not revealed simply by 
its literal text, but rather is given meaning through the evolutionary process of 
common-law adjudication; though the source of the rule is found in the Con-
stitution, it is nevertheless largely a judge-made rule of law.”192  While the 
person of ordinary firmness standard for a retaliation claim stems from the 
First Amendment, it is defined and clarified by common law.193  Thus, prece-
dent indicates that appellate courts are just as capable as trial courts at deter-
mining whether an act would chill a person of ordinary firmness.194 
 
 187. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 693; Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). 
 188. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696. 
 189. Street, 394 U.S. at 592 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942)). 
 190. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501–02 
(1984). 
 191. Id. at 502. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 532 (4th Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that “the threat of continued and heightened regulatory scrutiny” sometimes can 
have a chilling effect); Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1252 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(“There is no reason to ‘reward’ government officials for picking on unusually hardy 
speakers.”); Garcia v. City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
although it is true that “how [a] plaintiff acted might be evidence of what a reasonable 
person would have done,” the ordinary firmness inquiry is at bottom “an objective 
one, not subjective”). 
 194. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996) (applying independ-
ent review to a “reasonable person” standard); Bose, 466 U.S. at 502 (noting that 
independent review should be applied to standards that are defined and clarified 
through common law). 
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2.  The Need to Clarify Legal Principles and Unify Precedent 
In determining whether a mixed issue requires independent review, the 
Court also considers whether a need exists to clarify precedent.195  This need 
surfaces most often when trial courts throughout a state or nation apply the 
law in different ways.196  Further, clear precedent also ensures that appellate 
courts maintain control of important constitutional principles and that the 
factual application to these principles is applied consistently.197  Fundamental 
rights such as freedom of expression and the right to privacy should not be 
unconstitutionally limited because of a trial court’s error.198 
For example, in Ornelas the Court asserted that unifying precedent in 
the area of reasonable suspicion and probable cause would “come closer to 
providing law enforcement officers with a defined set of rules which, in most 
instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to 
whether an invasion of privacy is justified.”199  Viewing Bennie through the 
lens of this Ornelas rule yields further insight into whether the person of or-
dinary firmness standard should receive independent review.  The determina-
tion of whether a government’s actions would chill a person of ordinary firm-
ness would be most effective if the outcome were reached consistently 
throughout the state or nation.  Similar to the rule for determining reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause, clear lines of precedent would “come closer to 
providing [state actors] with a defined set of rules which, in most instances, 
makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether 
[the government action] is justified.”200 
In Bennie, the District Court for the District of Nebraska decided the 
case in the state’s favor and the Eighth Circuit applied clear error review to 
affirm.201  It is conceivable that the same state actors could do even less in a 
different situation and that, without going against precedent, a different Ne-
braska court could find that their acts would chill a person of ordinary firm-
ness.  Because this claim was reviewed using clear error, there is currently no 
 
 195. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697. 
 196. Id. at 697–98. 
 197. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985). 
 198. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697 (“A policy of sweeping deference would per-
mit, [i]n the absence of any significant difference in the facts, the Fourth Amend-
ment’s incidence [to] tur[n] on whether different trial judges draw general conclu-
sions that the facts are sufficient or insufficient to constitute probable cause.” (altera-
tions in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160, 171 (1949))). 
 199. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting New York v. Belton, 435 U.S. 454, 
458 (1981)). 
 200. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 201. Bennie v. Munn, 822 F.3d 392, 398, 401 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 814 (2017). 
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precedent in this area and, consequently, no guidance for state actors or judg-
es.202 
Using independent review would have resulted in unequivocal precedent 
that future courts would be required to follow.  Had the Eighth Circuit used 
independent review, it would have likely held for Bennie.203  Future govern-
ment actors would then be put on notice that adverse action comparable to 
that which occurred in Bennie violates the First Amendment.  The person of 
ordinary firmness test, together with the other prongs of a First Amendment 
retaliation claim, exists to ensure protections of freedom of speech and ex-
pression, values that our country holds dear.204  These fundamental rights 
should not be inconsistent throughout a state or the nation. 
In his Ornelas dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the need to clarify 
precedent is not necessarily a valid justification for independent review.205  
He asserted that law clarification requires generalization “and some issues 
lend themselves to generalization much more than others.”206  For instance, a 
case requiring a determination of whether an officer was reasonable in believ-
ing he had probable cause to conduct a search has many unique factors that 
will rarely be present in future cases.207  Thus, according to Justice Scalia, 
precedent in this area is rarely useful.208 
Similarly, the factors in a First Amendment retaliation claim will fre-
quently differ.  The type of the protected activity and the extent of the adverse 
action are rarely going to be the same from case to case.  But this is an area in 
which precedent can, at the least, provide guidance to state actors.209  Further, 
the varying factors have little relevance when determining whether a state 
employee’s actions are enough to chill a person of ordinary firmness.  The 
person of ordinary firmness prong focuses solely on how a state employee’s 
actions will impact a reasonable person.210  Thus, the circumstances of the 
person whose speech is chilled are not relevant because the reasonable person 
standard is applied in every case.  But the governmental acts do matter.  Prec-
edent in this area would provide government employees and judges with a 
 
 202. See id. at 398. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[C]riticism of 
public officials lies at the very core of speech protected by the First Amendment.” 
(citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 269–70 (1964))); see also Naucke v. 
City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Retaliation by a government 
actor in response to such an exercise of First Amendment rights forms a basis for § 
1983 liability.”). 
 205. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 703–04 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 206. Id. at 703. 
 207. Id. at 703–04. 
 208. Id. at 703. 
 209. Id. at 697–98 (majority opinion). 
 210. Bennie v. Munn, 822 F.3d 392, 400 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
814 (2017). 
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gauge for measuring the constitutionality of various government acts, even 
though the acts typically differ depending on the situation. 
3.  The Possible Bias of the Fact Finder 
Possible bias of the fact finder is one final consideration of the Court 
when determining whether the appellate judge is in a better position than the 
fact finder of the lower court to make decisions of mixed questions of fact 
and law.211  This consideration typically carries less weight than those 
above212 but is worth addressing in the context of First Amendment retalia-
tion.  As stated, when determining whether an action would chill a person of 
ordinary firmness, the type of speech is irrelevant.  But a jury could easily be 
unconsciously driven to decide against an individual simply because jurors do 
not agree with the type of speech in which the individual engaged.213  This 
possibility did not surface in Bennie because the issue was decided in a bench 
trial,214 but future First Amendment retaliation cases could be tried before 
juries.  This mixed question of fact and law is better left to a judge who can 
accurately understand and apply the law.215 
B.  Issues Involving an Important Constitutional Right 
A second key justification for applying independent review is the pres-
ence of an important constitutional right.216  According to the Supreme Court, 
the Constitution imposes on it the “final authority to determine the meaning 
and application of the words of that instrument” and this responsibility com-
pels it “to examine for [itself] the statements in issue and the circumstances 
under which they [are] made.”217  Laws such as First Amendment retaliation, 
which exist to promote First Amendment values, fall under this category.218 
 
 211. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (“[O]n rare occasions in years 
past the Court has justified independent federal or appellate review as a means of 
compensating for ‘perceived shortcomings of the trier of fact by way of bias or some 
other factor.’” (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 
518 (1984))). 
 212. See id. 
 213. See Lisa Blue & Pamela Francis, Know the Law of Your Jurisdiction – Chal-
lenges for Cause – Bias and Prejudice, in 3 LITIGATING TORT CASES § 34:8 (2017). 
 214. Bennie, 822 F.3d at 396. 
 215. Miller, 474 U.S. at 114. 
 216. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (noting that an 
independent examination of the record must be made in order to ensure that the judg-
ment does not constitute an intrusion on a constitutional right). 
 217. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946). 
 218. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 
(“The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one’s mind is not only 
an aspect of individual liberty – and thus a good unto itself – but also is essential to 
the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.  Under our Consti-
24
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As the Eighth Circuit noted in Bennie, all of the First Amendment deci-
sions that used independent review addressed the question of whether a par-
ticular category of speech was protected.219  But these decisions did not limit 
independent review to these questions; in fact, these cases emphasized the 
importance of using independent review when a case involves an important 
constitutional question, such as one involving the First Amendment.220  In 
clarifying the considerations enunciated in Sullivan, Bose explicitly stated 
that independent review was important in First Amendment cases because of 
the “constitutional values protected by the rule.”221  The Court also noted that 
an independent examination of the record was necessary to ensure that “the 
judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expres-
sion.”222 
The issue in Bennie does not involve the question of whether a particu-
lar category of speech is protected, but some of the same justifications for 
independent review applied in the other First Amendment decisions are rele-
vant and applicable.223  The First Amendment retaliation cause of action ex-
ists to ensure that individuals can engage in protected speech without experi-
encing adverse action from the government.224  Thus, determining whether 
government action would chill a person of ordinary firmness protects im-
portant First Amendment values.225  This determination also involves a ques-
 
tution ‘there is no such thing as a false idea.  However pernicious an opinion may 
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on 
the competition of other ideas.’” (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 
339–40 (1974))). 
 219. Bennie, 822 F.3d at 398 n.3. 
 220. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285 (“This Court’s duty is not limited to the elabo-
ration of constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence 
to make certain that those principles have been constitutionally applied. This is such a 
case, particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass across the line between 
speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated.” 
(internal quotations omitted)); Bose, 466 U.S. at 502 (“[T]he constitutional values 
protected by the rule make it imperative that judges – and in some cases judges of this 
Court – make sure that it is correctly applied.”); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Les-
bian & Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 567 (1995) (“This obligation rests 
upon us simply because the reaches of the First Amendment are ultimately defined by 
the facts it is held to embrace, and we must thus decide for ourselves whether a given 
course of conduct falls on the near or far side of the line of constitutional protec-
tion.”). 
 221. Bose, 466 U.S. at 502. 
 222. Id. at 507 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285). 
 223. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 224. Bennie v. Munn, 58 F. Supp. 3d 936, 942 (D. Neb. 2014) (“The law is settled 
that as a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from 
subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions for speaking out.”), aff’d, 822 F.3d 392 
(8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 814 (2017). 
 225. Id.  The person of ordinary firmness determination is one of three prongs 
within a First Amendment claim.  Id. 
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tion of whether there existed a “forbidden intrusion on the field of free ex-
pression.”226  Because the state regulators repeatedly investigated Bennie and 
reviewed his work, and these investigations increased after Bennie engaged in 
political speech, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that the regulators’ actions 
were “wholly inappropriate – and absolutely inconsistent with the First 
Amendment.”227  Thus, the regulators’ actions undoubtedly intruded upon 
Bennie’s field of free expression. 
The Eighth Circuit’s failure to apply independent review for the person 
of ordinary firmness prong denied Bennie the afforded remedy228 for the vio-
lation of his constitutional right.  Not only is Bennie without a declaratory 
judgment or injunctive relief, but no precedent prevents government actors 
from violating individuals’ First Amendment rights in the future.  Because of 
its decision to use the clear error standard of review, the Eighth Circuit had 
no option but to validate the actions of the state regulators, despite their clear-
ly unconstitutional acts.  Had the panel used independent review, the court 
would have reversed the district court because the district court incorrectly 
emphasized whether Bennie’s speech was in fact chilled, instead of whether 
the speech of a person of ordinary firmness would have been chilled.229  To 
remain consistent in protecting First Amendment values, courts should apply 
independent review to the person of ordinary firmness prong of First 
Amendment retaliation claims. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Bennie v. Munn, the Eighth Circuit held the district court did not 
clearly err in holding that the state regulators’ actions, which included height-
ened regulation and scrutiny after Bennie made negative comments about 
President Obama and actively participated in the Tea Party political move-
ment, would not have chilled a person of ordinary firmness.230  The Eighth 
Circuit asserted that independent review did not apply because the issue pre-
sented was not whether Bennie’s speech was protected but the deterrent effect 
of the state regulators’ actions.231  Issues addressing whether a category of 
speech is protected do receive independent review, but the considerations for 
whether an issue receives independent review are actually much broader.  
When determining whether an issue should receive independent review, the 
 
 226. Bose, 466 U.S. at 499 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285). 
 227. Bennie, 822 F.3d at 401.  Because the reviewing court used the “clear error” 
standard, it could not reverse the district court’s finding that the action would not chill 
a person of ordinary firmness.  See id. at 398. 
 228. Id. at 397–98, 401.  Bennie asked for a declaratory judgment and injunctions 
against future retaliation.  Id. 
 229. Id. at 397–98. 
 230. Id. at 401. 
 231. Id. at 398 n.3. 
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Court considers whether the question is one of mixed fact and law and 
whether the question addresses an important constitutional issue.232 
Despite the existence of both factors in Bennie, the Eighth Circuit swift-
ly dismissed the possibility of independent review, and the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari on the issue of the appropriate standard of review in this 
context.  Independent review has never been used for the person of ordinary 
firmness prong of the First Amendment, but expansion of the use of the 
standard seems justified to preserve the country’s fundamental constitutional 
values. 
It is important, though, that independent review is not overused.  Dis-
senting Justices have cautioned against independent review’s expansion, em-
phasizing that in most cases, the district court is better positioned to make 
these determinations of fact.233  Generations of scholars have noted that ex-
pansion of independent review could also overcrowd appellate courts.234 
It can be explained why the Eighth Circuit did not apply independent 
review and why the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari, but room certain-
ly remains for clarification in this area of the law.  Bennie demonstrates the 
importance of examining the standard of review for cases in which it is un-
clear.235  The standard of review not only structures the lawyer’s argument 
and serves as the lens through which the judge views the case, but the stand-
ard is sometimes dispositive.236  The Court’s precedent indicates that inde-
pendent review is justified for the person of ordinary firmness prong of a First 
Amendment retaliation claim because the prong involves a mixed question of 
fact and law and recognition of an important constitutional right, both of 
which trigger the application of independent review. 
 
 232. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 233. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 701 (1996) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (“[T]here is no rigid rule with respect to mixed questions.  We have said that 
deferential review of mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when it appears 
that the district court is better positioned than the appellate court to decide the issue in 
question or that probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal 
doctrine.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 
U.S. 225, 233 (1991))). 
 234. See, e.g., John Dickenson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Determinations of Questions of “Constitutional Fact,” 80 U. PA. L. REV. 1055, 
1062 (1932) (“A principal reason for the introduction of administrative procedure and 
the establishment of administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial power has been to 
make possible new types of supposedly desirable governmental activity which could 
not be carried on at all if the burden had to be borne by the already overcrowded 
courts.  In view of the volume of this added business, the courts, to the extent that 
they are called on to retry on new evidence fact-issues previously decided by adminis-
trative tribunals, will inevitably have their dockets so clogged as to impede the per-
formance not merely of the additional business, but of their own proper business of 
handling private litigation as well.”) 
 235. Bennie, 822 F.3d. at 398 (“The standard of review applied here likely is dis-
positive.”). 
 236. Id.  
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